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EXPERIENCE RATING OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
IN MICHIGAN AND OTHER STATES: 
A MICROECONOMIC COMPARISON FOR 1988
Timothy L. Hunt and Christopher J. O'Leary 
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction
This study compares the extent of experience rating in unemployment 
insurance (UI) in Michigan to that in 27 other industrial states in 1988. The 
study neither suggests nor endorses any specific policy action but rather 
focuses on the issues of (1) measurement of the extent of UI experience rating 
in the 1988 statutory provisions and (2) comparison of the extent of UI 
experience rating across states.
Experience rating defined
When a business firm is effectively experience rated, the firm's UI taxes 
increase when there is an increase in benefits paid to the firm's unemployed 
workers, and taxes fall when benefit payments fall. Statutory provisions such 
as minimum tax rates, maximum tax rates, and taxable wage ceilings may reduce 
the direct response of taxes to benefit payments.
Design of the study
This study extends the simulation methodology of three earlier reports by 
Timothy Hunt (1986, 1987 and 1988) which compared UI tax costs and worker 
benefits across states. The same computerized structural model of state UI 
systems is used here to contrast the degree of UI experience rating in Michigan 
in 1988 with that in 27 other states listed by groups in Table A.
Nine hypothetical firm types, characterized by various insured unemployment 
rates and average annual wage levels (IUR-AAW), are examined. Two simulations 
are run to estimate the degree of experience rating for each hypothetical firm 
type. In the first simulation, called the control run, the insured unemployment 
rate remains constant for thirty periods, representing thirty years. In the 
second, called the spike run, the IUR increases in period eleven, and then 
returns to the pre-spike level for the remaining nineteen periods.
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The simulation process is illustrated graphically by two figures. Figure 
A shows the control and spike values of the UI tax cost, while Figure B shows 
the control and spike values of UI benefits charged. The figures summarize the 
thirty year experience of an average-average Michigan firm.
The concept of taxes involved here is not just the affect on 1988 UI tax 
bills, rather it is the long term impact on taxes which results from a change 
in benefit charges. In Figure A it can be seen that the additional UI tax 
which results from a change in benefit charges is paid back over six years. 
Since a firm incurs this future cost at the time the layoff decision is made, 
it is natural to consider the full cost of a change in benefit charges to be 
the present discounted value of the additional tax payments.
Method of measuring experience rating
Experience rating provisions were designed to tie UI tax changes to 
benefit charge changes, therefore the working of these laws is best described 
by an indicator of the responsiveness of taxes to changes in benefit charges. 
The degree of experience rating is summarized by a concept called the marginal 
UI tax cost of a change in benefits, or marginal cost (MC) for short. The MC 
is computed as the ratio of the change in UI taxes to the change in benefits 
paid.
By using MC as a measure of contrast between state experience rating 
systems, comparison depends on how the UI taxes of various hypothetical firms 
respond to a change in benefit charges. Since we control for firm 
characteristics in this "micro" approach, any difference across states in tax 
treatment must be attributable to a difference in statutory provisions.
When examining the MC estimates, several points should be remembered. 
First, these estimates are for hypothetical firm types; it is impossible to 
easily relate these results to the experience of any group of actual Michigan 
firms. Second, the marginal cost figures summarize the responsiveness of the 
tax system; a value of MC greater than zero indicates that UI taxes will 
respond to a change in benefit charges. The greater the value of MC the more 
responsive is the system. Third, it is impossible to extrapolate from MC to 
trust fund solvency statements. MC summarizes only an incremental tax change, 
not an average or total tax change.
Experience rating in Michigan compared to other states
Table B summarizes the nominal marginal cost and ranking for the 
hypothetical firms under the Michigan UI experience rating system compared to 
27 other state systems for a 1% spike of insured unemployment. The marginal 
cost (MC) estimates given indicate that all hypothetical firm types considered 
are effectively experience rated in Michigan. The rankings which appear in 
parentheses in Table B are the position of Michigan when the MCs for a given 
firm type across all 28 states are ordered from high to low. The ranking 
results indicate that among the 28 states compared, Michigan is ranked no lower 
than sixth and is ranked first in two instances.
iii
The nominal 1% spike results suggest that all firm types are relatively 
highly experience rated in Michigan, the MC estimates range from 1.03 to 1.84 
with these values always being ranked in the top six of the 28 states. 
The MC figures for the average-high and high-high firms are lower than for 
other firms because the tax rate cap for one component of the Michigan tax is 
reached for these firms when the IUR rises by 1%. Note that among the 28 
states, these firms are relatively as experience rated in Michigan as any other 
firm type considered, being ranked sixth and fourth respectively.
In Table C the present value results for a 1% spike in IUR are listed. 
These were computed by introducing a 10% discount rate when adding up the 
annual tax costs. Naturally the marginal cost figures fall as a result of 
discounting, but Michigan remains in the top quarter of the 28 states in terms 
of tax system responsiveness. The relatively long five year benefit history in 
Michigan's tax formula only slightly affects the state experience rating 
ranking.
Among the regional groupings considered, the great lakes states have a 
high relative degree of statutory experience rating. Tables D and E show that 
among the eight great lakes states Michigan is always ranked in the top half. 
Furthermore, the hypothetical firm type with the lowest nominal and discounted 
marginal cost in Michigan--the high-high firm--is shown to be highly experience 
rated in Michigan relative to the treatment of the high-high firm type in other 
states of the Great Lakes region.
Some other important findings not listed in this summary bear mention. 
The estimates of tax system responsiveness are consistent for modest and more 
severe spikes of insured unemployment. Marginal cost estimates for a doubling 
of the firm's insured unemployment rate are similar in magnitude and ranking to 
those for the 1% spike. A sensitivity analysis of the statutes confirmed 
certain expectations, and revealed some other facts about how the various 
provisions in the Michigan UI tax system affect the degree of experience 
rating. The general finding was that if restrictions like the taxable wage 
base ceiling are removed, MCs become equal across firm types.
Summary
The Michigan UI tax system experience rates the hypothetical firms 
considered here relatively well compared to other state systems. If all tax 
payback streams are discounted, the Michigan system ranks slightly lower 
compared to other states. Among the regional groupings considered, the Great 
Lakes states have the highest relative degree of statutory experience rating, 
and Michigan is always ranked in the top half of the eight Great Lakes states. 
Taxes for firms under the Michigan system are equally responsive to modest and 
more severe bouts of insured unemployment.
Finally, a caveat on the interpretation of these results. The estimates 
reported here apply only in the in the context of the hypothetical cases 
considered. The present findings should be reexamined in the context of a 
"macro" study which relies on the actual distribution of firms by insured 
unemployment, average wages, and initial reserve account level.
IV
Table A. States in Each of the Groupings 




































































VTable B. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 28 States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 




















Table C. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 28 States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table D. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the Great Lakes States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 
(Michigan Rank in Parentheses)
Insured 


















Table E. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the Great Lakes States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
EXPERIENCE RATING OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
IN MICHIGAN AND OTHER STATES: 
A MICROECONOMIC COMPARISON FOR 1988
I. INTRODUCTION
Unemployment insurance (UI) provides temporary benefits to covered workers 
during periods of involuntary unemployment. Established by the Social Security 
Act in 1935, the UI system is a cooperative federal-state program in which the 
states retain broad discretionary powers to determine the specifics of their 
individual programs. Consequently, the UI system varies widely by state.
The UI system is financed almost entirely by employer contributions. The 
states are primarily responsible for providing the bulk of regular benefit
o
payments to their workers . Benefit payments are by far the largest proportion 
of total UI costs. The federal government pays for administration of the 
federal-state program, assumes partial responsibility for the cost of extended 
benefits, and maintains a federal unemployment trust fund from which states 
may borrow should any state exhaust their state unemployment trust fund. Since
\
z A few state UI systems are also financed by employee contributions. Two 
of the 28 states in this study have such a tax, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
Details of the UI tax systems for the 28 states examined here are given in Hunt 
(1988).
Q
-> As discussed later, regular benefits are generally available for a 
maximum of 26 weeks. Details of the UI benefit provisions in the 28 states 
examined here can be found in Hunt (1988).
^ Extended benefits are provided to workers who have exhausted regular 
benefits in states only when state unemployment reaches certain prescribed 
levels.
2any federal loans to states must eventually be repaid by those states, the UI 
system is essentially self-financed by each state's own employers.
Employer UI taxes are not assessed uniformly or through any simple 
function of firm wages and unemployment in any state. UI taxes are experience 
rated in all states. When a firm' is effectively experience rated, the firm's 
UI taxes are directly related to the firm's insured unemployment. Taxes 
increase when there is an increase in benefits paid to the firm's unemployed
Q
workers, and taxes fall when benefits fall. However, certain statutory 
provisions such as minimum tax rates, maximum tax rates, and taxable wage 
ceilings may render the experience rating system ineffective. For firms with a 
recent history of particularly high insured unemployment it is very possible 
that an increase in insured unemployment will not affect UI taxes at all. The 
response in a firm's UI taxes relative to a change in unemployment benefit 
charges is therefore the best measure of experience rating at the firm or 
"micro" level.
Unless an employee tax is imposed, of course.
" Of the 53 jurisdictions in the United States operating UI systems, only 
in Puerto Rico are there no experience rating provisions. In this report the 
word "state" is used to refer to a UI jurisdiction, a group which includes the 
fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
' For UI tax purposes employers are referred to as establishments, a label 
which can apply to profit making business firms, non profit organizations, and 
other employers. In this paper we frequently use the concise label: firm.
  The principle involved is similar to the case of private auto insurance 
where the premium is increased for a car owner with a poor recent driving 
record, and the premium is decreased for good driving experience.
3The three principal reasons for experience rating of UI are: 1) To 
encourage stabilization of employment, 2) To properly allocate the costs of 
unemployment, and 3) To encourage participation of employers in the UI system. 
On the first point, firms seeking to maximize profit or minimize costs should 
be slower to reduce their workforce if each successive layoff costs more in UI 
taxes. The second point is that the price of goods should fully reflect their 
costs of production, this point regards the social efficiency aspects of 
resource utilization; where employment varies more widely a higher cost of 
unemployment should be imputed into the price of the good. The third point is 
that by charging higher taxes for successive layoffs firms will be encouraged 
to keep vigilant of UI claims against them and remain fully involved in UI 
eligibility determination, making it a more accurate process.
Given the freedom specifically reserved to the states to structure their 
UI statutes, it should not be surprising that there exists tremendous variation 
in the actual degree and method of experience rating among the states.
Some attempts have been made to compare experience rating across state 
programs on an aggregate basis. ^ The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has begun 
to report on one index for interstate comparison regularly.  "  The development
^ Complete discussions of the objectives of experience rating can be found 
in Haber and Murray (1966) and Becker (1972).
*-® Becker (1972) and Wandner and Crosslin (1980) have reported comparisons 
of experience rating across selected states.
11 After the 1985 report of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), the 
Division of Actuarial Services in the U.S. Department of Labor developed an 
experience rating index (ERI) along with the OIG. On September 21, 1987 0MB 
approved a revised ETA-204 Experience Rating Report which will provide data to 
compute the new ERI. ETA published their ERI for the 1988 rate year in UI Data
4of this index followed the release of an Office of Inspector General (1985) 
report entitled "Financing the Unemployment Insurance Program has Shifted from 
a System based on Individual Employer's Responsibility Towards a Socialized 
System." The study found that the fraction of total benefit payments which are 
not chargeable to a particular establishment has increased in recent years. 
The DOL index focuses on the proportion of benefit charges which are non- 
socialized costs. The present study proceeds from the premise that comparison 
of experience rating across states can be best achieved by conducting a firm 
level analysis for a variety of worker/firm situations.
Such micro level analysis has the advantage that it isolates the interstate
differences in experience rating due to differences in the statutory provisions
1 9 themselves. ^ Given the complexities of the individual state UI programs, it
should be understood at the outset that the research methodology underlying 
this study only provides approximations of the degree of experience rating.
The purpose of this study is to compare the total impact of the UI 
statutes in 1988 on experience rating of UI in Michigan relative to other 
states for similarly situated establishments. In Section II the structure of 
the model for analysis is reviewed. This section also includes a statement of 
the hypothetical worker/firm situations to be considered, and the states 
examined. Specific estimates of the degree of experience rating in Michigan 
relative to the various state groupings are reviewed in Section III, where a
Summary. Employment and Training Administration (1988).
*-*• The interested reader can consult the study by Hunt (1985) for a 
further elaboration of this general methodology and an application of it to a 
wide variety of state and local tax costs.
5detailed description of the methodology is given. Results of a sensitivity 
analysis of how changes in the features of the Michigan tax law would affect 
the degree of experience rating in Michigan are given in Section IV. Finally, 
conclusions are offered in Section V.
Before proceeding, it should be emphasized that this study neither 
suggests nor endorses any specific policy actions but rather focuses on the 
issue of experience rating at the establishment level. Although the research 
methodology of this study is highly detailed, it does not deal with a number of 
the features of the UI system such as the role that the complicated statutory 
and administrative structure plays in "qualifying" workers for benefits. The 
limitations of this study are discussed in more detail in each section of the 
report.
II. A SIMULATION MODEL FOR EVALUATING EXPERIENCE RATING
This study extends the methodology of three earlier works by Hunt (1986, 
1987, and 1988) which compared UI tax costs and worker benefits across states. ^ 
Those investigations were conducted at the firm level using a structural model 
of each state's UI system. The approach was to simulate as closely as possible 
the way in which an individual worker's benefit and the employer's UI taxes are 
actually determined in each state. The characteristics of the worker and firm
 *- * The Economic Alliance for Michigan not only provided partial financial 
support for the 1986 study but also their Unemployment Insurance Staff Group 
provided valuable technical advice in constructing the model. The 1987 study 
was supported in part by the Economic Alliance for Michigan, Michigan 
Department of Commerce, Michigan Department of Labor, Michigan House of 
Representatives, and the Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency. The 1988 study was 
prepared for the governor's UI Fact Finding Group.
6were assumed to be invariant across the states, so that any differences in the 
tax and benefit estimates could be attributed to the statutory provisions of 
the state UI programs. This structural model is hereafter referred to as the 
Unemployment Insurance Micro-Simulation Model (UIMSM).
The research underlying this report involved the development of additional 
UIMSM algorithms for the experience rating analysis. To implement this 
extended version of UIMSM, the program was converted from a PC lotus spreadsheet 
to a mainframe SAS program. ^ The new environment accommodates the added size, 
and provides the required flexibility to compute the necessary multi-period 
computations.
The 28 states included in this study are the largest manufacturing states 
in the U.S., as shown in Table 1. Cumulatively they account for just over 90 
percent of all U.S. manufacturing employment. The large number of states in 
UIMSM permits the examination of certain regional aggregations of states as 
well as consideration of the 28-state average. First, the Great Lakes states 
are defined to include those eight states which border on one of the Great 
Lakes, namely Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. These are the same eight states examined in Hunt 
(1986, 1987, and 1989) and at least one other study as well (St. Antoine, 
1984). These seven states are Michigan's nearest neighbors, they share a
^ The 1988 provisions which were estimated for states with changes slated 
to become effective mid-year or later in Hunt (1988) have been replaced with 
the actual program parameters.
































































































































































States in capital letters have been included in this study.
common industrial structure, and many of them are repaying or have repaid large 
UI debts to the federal government, incurred during the last recession.
The other two aggregations of the 28 states in the study follow the U.S. 
Bureau of the Census definitions of regions, as shown in Figure 1. The 
combined Northeast and Northcentral states include the eight Great Lakes states 
plus Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, and New Jersey, while the 
Southern states include Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 
The figure should make it clear that this study does not include all of the 
states in the South but rather the 12 largest Southern states in terms of 
manufacturing employment (out of a total of 16 Southern states identified by 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census) and the largest 13 of 22 states in the combined 
Northeast-Northcentral region. Since only three states from the West are 
included in this study, it is not identified as a separate region in the 
analysis, but those states are included in the average for all 28 states.
This report focuses on the comparison of how provisions for experience 
rating of UI taxes affect the cost of layoffs for hypothetical firms located in 
Michigan relative to identical firms located in other states. Two key variables 
characterize a hypothetical firm: the insured unemployment rate and the average 
annual wage level. The five year (1983-87) national average weekly insured 
unemployment rate-'--' of 2.9 percent is defined as "average" for this
 "-^ Insured unemployment rates are significantly lower than total 
unemployment rates. The insured unemployed are limited to covered workers 
qualifying for benefits, while total unemployment rates account for all those 
seeking work, whether or not covered by the UI system. Clearly, the insured 
unemployment rate is the more appropriate concept for a study of the UI system.
Figure 1 
STATES SELECTED FOR STUDY BY REGION
Great Lakes States
Source: Bureau of the Census, General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary. 1980 Census 
of Population. PC80-1-C2.
Note: Four separate regions are analyzed in this study: all 28 states, the eight preat Lakes states, the 13 
states in the combined Northeast-Northcentral region, and the 12 states in the South.
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study, double that figure Is labeled "high", and one-half of it as "low." 
Similarly, "average" annual wages for this study are $20,200, the national 
average wage for all UI covered workers in private employment in 1986 (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1987), updated to 1987 levels-*-" using the average 
change in wages from 1986 to 1987 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1988). 17 
In similar fashion, "high" average annual wages are $32,700, and "low" average 
annual wages are $11,300, the highest and lowest average annual industrial 
wages for industries covered by UI data. The nine "hypothetical" firms for 
this study, arrayed in Table 2, are therefore representative of actual industry 
data and provide a reasonably broad range of wages and unemployment with which 
to conduct the simulations.
Table 2. Characteristics of Hypothetical Establishments




















1  In reality, of course, the 1988 taxes incurred by employers will be 
based upon 1988 wages actually paid by those employers. For purposes of this 
research, however, it is far simpler to utilize the estimated 1987 wage bill. 
Moreover, since wages are fixed (constant) across all 28 states and the total 
impact of the UI statutes are estimated, a small change in wages would not 
impact the interstate comparisons substantively in any event.
 *-' At the time of this writing, data for the growth of wages in 1987 were 
available only for non-supervisory workers.
11
Prior to the specification of a hypothetical firm's insured unemployment 
rate and average annual wage, decisions regarding the specification of the 
dependency status and exhaustion rate of the firm's insured layoffs must be 
made. UIMSM contains the detailed methods used by the states themselves to 
compute a claimant's benefits, including rounding provisions. In UIMSM it is 
assumed that all workers are earning the average wage for that firm and that 
one-half of the workers are married with a working spouse and two dependents, 
except for low wage simulations where it is assumed that none of the workers 
have dependents. Furthermore, all workers are assumed to be eligible for the 
maximum duration of benefits and to actually apply for benefits if laid off. " 
Thus, these simplifying assumptions should make it clear that access to UI
benefits is assumed for all workers in this study, in spite of the fact that
90 there is great variation in qualifying criteria across states. u
1  It is well-known that dependency status varies significantly with wage 
levels. In 1978, the last year for which data on dependency allowances are 
available from the UI system (U.S. Employment and Training Administration, 
1979:22-24), only about one-third of all beneficiaries claimed any dependents 
(in those states that had dependency allowances, of course), while that figure 
jumped to about one-half for workers receiving the maximum weekly benefit 
amount. Furthermore, of those workers claiming dependents, only 15 percent had 
a dependent spouse, while 94 percent claimed from one to three total 
dependents. It turns out that at national average wages many workers qualify 
for near maximum benefit amounts. Thus, the wage/dependency combinations 
selected for this study are arbitrary but consistent with available data.
In the simulations it is assumed that 33.6% is the benefit exhaustion 
rate for a firm's UI claimants. This figure is the five year weighted average 
(1982-87) of national figures reported in Unemployment Insurance Financial 
Data. ET Handbook 394 and issues of Quarterly Unemployment Insurance 
Compilation and Characteristics for 1987.
90 In general, monetary qualifying requirements will have the greatest
impact on part-time workers earning at or close to minimum wages with less than 
one-half year of employment. For instance, Michigan has both a regular 
earnings qualifier and an alternate earnings qualifier. The regular earnings 
qualifier, applicable to the vast majority of claimants in Michigan, requires
12
As discussed in Hunt (1986:5-6), UIMSM is highly stylized, meaning that 
the model only accounts for a limited number of the many institutional 
characteristics of the state UI systems that can affect individual benefit 
levels. UIMSM does not include extended benefits, monetary and nonmonetary 
eligibility requirements, or special provisions for part-time workers, work- 
sharing, and seasonal workers, among others. Turnover is limited to that 
implied by the firm's unemployment rate. These limitations notwithstanding, it 
should also be noted that no data base exists from which to develop the 
detailed characteristics of the workforce which would be necessary to include 
more of the complicated UI statutory and administrative structure in the 
model. 21
At this point a few items merit special emphasis. First, it is the long 
term impact of the 1988 statutory provisions that is estimated not just the 
affect on 1988 UI tax bills. For instance, increases in weekly benefit amounts
20 credit weeks in the most recent 52 calendar week period, where a credit week 
is defined as $100.50 in earnings, for a minimum total earnings of $2,010. 
This is among the more stringent monetary qualifying requirements of the states 
in this study, but note also that a worker in Michigan earning the federal 
minimum wage of $3.35 per hour must work only 30 hours per week to earn a 
credit week. The hypothetical workers in this study are earning $5.43 per hour 
at low wages, $9.71 per hour at average wages, and $15.72 per hour at high 
wages. Thus, unless the hypothetical firms have an unusual distribution of 
wages and employment, one would expect that state monetary qualifying criteria 
would play an extremely minor role in the simulations with average and high 
wages and a minor but perhaps more significant role in the simulations with low 
wages.
91*•*- The effects that changing eligibility criteria and other factors have
had on increasing the gap between the insured unemployment rate and the total 
unemployment rate nationwide have been explored elsewhere (Burtless, 1983). 
The U.S. Department of Labor recently sponsored a major study of this subject 
by Corson and Nicholson (1988).
13
in 1988 are not expected to impact 1988 taxes, because current tax rates are a 
function of the firm's experience in prior years. In future years, however, 
1988 benefits will become an obligation of employers and therefore are a 
legitimate part of the economic costs of UI in 1988. The full tax impact of UI 
benefits charged against a firm in a given year is the total cost which is paid 
back over time.
Second, this study focuses exclusively on the UI statutes actually in 
place and effective during 1988. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
evaluate legislated changes and automatic provisions for change that are 
scheduled to be effective in future years. Concomitantly, various so-called 
temporary or emergency taxes are included in this study because they are 
actually effective in 1988 regardless of the fact that they may expire at a 
future date. While projecting the impacts of UI in the years ahead is an 
important subject, this study is limited to following the 1988 statutes as 
closely as possible, thereby determining the impacts of the known, existing 
legislation.
Finally, it should be emphasized that there is no simple way to aggregate 
the micro estimates from this study to arrive at statewide estimates of 
experience rating. Similarly, there is no reason to think that any one of the 
nine simulations are more significant than the others. In short, rather than 
focusing on the estimates from any individual simulation one should examine the 
general trends in experience rating across the simulations of this study.
14 
III. Measurement of Experience Rating
The individual state UI tax structures, especially their experience rated 
elements, are complex and differ considerably across the states. The general 
provisions for each state's experience rating system and any uniform rate 
additions for all 28 states in UIMSM are presented in Table 3. Three methods 
are used for experience rating in these 28 states: reserve ratio, benefit 
ratio, and benefit wage ratio. In the reserve ratio approach the cumulative 
balance in the employer's experience rating account (generally all past 
experienced rated taxes paid less all benefits charged) is divided by a payroll 
measure. In the other two systems, the benefit ratio and the benefit-wage 
approach, the taxes paid by the employer are not a factor in the rate 
determination process nor does the employer have an experience rating account. 
They rely on benefits charged or benefit-wages (wages represented by benefits 
charged) divided by some payroll measure (both over a specified time period) to 
more directly determine the employer's tax rate. The employer's basic experience 
determined tax rates in all systems may also be multiplied by a specified 
factor and/or there may be uniform additional tax rates, all of which act to 
increase employer tax rates.
The actual implementation by the states of the three separate types of 
experience rating may be very different indeed. Two states, Michigan and 
Pennsylvania, use combined reserve ratio and benefit ratio systems. The 
combined systems have interesting properties which, for Michigan, will be 
examined in Section IV of this report where a sensitivity analysis of the 
statutes is conducted.
15


















































































































































































































Source: Based on data from the employment security agencies of the 
individual states and the U.S. Department of Labor.
BWR = Benefit Wage Ratio 
RR = Reserve Ratio 
BR = Benefit Ratio
Note: Footnotes follow on subsequent page.
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Table 3. Footnotes
1 Michigan and Pennsylvania also include a reserve ratio in computing a 
portion of the tax rate.
2 The rate additions apply only to positive balance employers in 
California and South Carolina (1.05%).
3 The rate additions cannot increase the maximum experience tax rates in 
Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, and South Carolina, or minimum and maximum 
tax rates in Georgia.
4 The rate addition does not increase the tax rate unless, when combined 
with other rating factors, the sum thereof rounds to the next highest 
one-tenth of one percent. The minimum tax rate is .1%.
5 There is also a variable, additional tax in North Carolina (0.002 to 
1.14%) and Texas (0.64% to 2%) that is determined from the employer's 
basic experience tax rate. In Wisconsin a variable additional rate of 
0.43% to 1.70% applies to employers with total payroll in excess of 
$200,000; for firms with smaller payrolls the variable additional rate 
ranges from 0.00% to 1.20%.
6 Tax rates do not include employee taxes in New Jersey (.625%) and 
Pennsylvania (.1%).
7 In Illinois for employers with quarterly payrolls less than $50,000 
and regular UI tax rates of 5.1% or higher the maximum tax is 5.0%.
17
Federal guidelines require that the state taxable wage base at least match 
the federal taxable wage base ($7,000), but states may have higher state 
taxable wage bases, and many do. Table 3 shows that there are precious few 
consistencies in the UI tax structure across the states, although federal rules 
require that the highest experience tax rate be at least 5.4 percent. States 
differ in terms of their usage of explicit surcharges, minimum tax rates, and 
maximum tax rates, among other ways. Notice that the minimum experience tax 
rates are not necessarily zero. All states must find a way to fund the 
uncharged benefits of bankrupt employers and the excess benefit charges of 
employers at ceiling tax rates, among other special situations. From the 
employer's perspective, the state experience rating systems are not necessarily 
pure cost recovery systems. In addition to the state rates, the minimum 
federal UI tax rates (0.8%) are assumed to be applicable in all 28 states in 
1988. 22
UIMSM contains the detailed tax provisions of the UI system, including the 
statutory provisions shown in Table 3, and the specific state tax schedules and 
computation methods used to determine the employer's tax rates. Among other 
details of the tax calculations, the model includes the charging provisions for 
each element of the tax, the lag between the data available on tax computation 
dates and the effective dates of those rates, rounding provisions, the effects
9 *3
of the waiting week on employer costs, J write-down procedures and tax limiters,
zz Employers in Michigan are not paying federal penalty taxes because the 
state has made the necessary debt repayments directly from state trust funds 
and met other federal solvency standards.
 ^ The effect of the waiting week on employer costs depends on the average 
duration rate of unemployment for the firm and the average exhaustion rate. In 
UIMSM these variables are assigned national average values of 16.1 weeks and
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if any. In UIMSM, the employer's UI record is maintained as would the states 
themselves in order to enhance the flexibility of the model and to facilitate 
the iteration of the model for any number of annual periods.
While the tax provisions of UIMSM are a reasonably detailed representation 
of reality, some deficiencies remain. The model deals only with the general 
state tax rates, ignoring any special rate provisions for particular types of 
employers by size, industry, or other factors. It also does not include the 
special tax provisions for new firms.^ Thus, it is assumed that the firms are 
permanent, with ongoing operations in each state. Benefit charges for extended 
benefits are not modeled,  * nor is there any specific accounting for each 
state's non-charging provisions or appeal procedures. Many of the features of 
UIMSM and its limits are described further in Hunt (1986).
Having detailed the range of statutory experience rating provisions 
captured in UIMSM we may now describe the assumptions and process used for 
measuring experience rating. Two ideas are fundamental to understanding our 
approach and the results generated by it, these have been stated earlier in 
this paper. First, to measure experience rating we seek to measure how a 
firm's UI taxes respond to a change in unemployment benefit charges. Second,
33.6 percent respectively for this study.
^ Most states assign a new firm a given tax rate for a year or so and 
then phase in experience rating. Notice that the total impact of the UI system 
on new employers over time asymptotically approaches that for a permanent 
ongoing employer, exactly the type of firm which is included in the model.
25 it should be noted that currently no states are paying extended 
benefits nor does the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Service expect extended 
benefits to be paid in the near future (U.S. Employment and Training 
Administration, September 1987:2).
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the concept of taxes involved here is the long term impact on taxes which 
result from a change in benefit charges under the 1988 statutory provisions, 
not just the affect on 1988 UI tax bills. Necessarily, therefore UIMSM is a 
multi-period simulation model, and certain aspects of its working should be 
clearly understood.
UIMSM is designed to simulate a hypothetical firm's UI taxes and benefit 
charges for thirty periods, representing thirty years. It is assumed that the 
1988 UI statutes for the 28 states apply in each of the thirty periods. To 
estimate the degree of experience rating--the tax response to a change in 
benefit charges--a one period change or "spike" of unemployment is imposed on 
the hypothetical firms in period eleven. Recall there are nine firm types, 
each characterized by a specific insured unemployment rate (IUR) and average 
annual earnings (AAE). The model is run for thirty periods. This provides 
adequate time (ten periods) to allow a firm to develop a benefit and tax 
history before a spike of insured unemployment is imposed, and enough time 
(nineteen periods) to observe the full impact of the unemployment spike on UI 
taxes. The historical information on benefit charges, tax payments, and the 
experience rating account (ERA) balance are necessary for the determination of 
present and future tax rates.
One requirement for conducting interstate comparison of experience rating 
for identically situated firms is that the initial ERA balance must be set at 
the level required in each state to achieve tax rate stability for the particular
20
r\ r
firm type.   This assumption of equilibrium (initial condition only) has the 
advantage that it captures the permanent, on-going costs of UI. Moreover, it 
is the only assumption possible to insure comparability across states because 
each state's UI system is so different under conditions of disequilibrium.
To estimate the degree of experience rating for each hypothetical firm and 
spike of insured unemployment two simulations must be run, the first is called 
the control run and the second the spike run. In the control run the assumed 
IUR remains constant for each of the thirty periods. For the spike run the IUR 
increases in period eleven, either by one percent or doubling, and then returns 
to the pre-spike level for the remaining nineteen periods. In each simulation 
total UI taxes and total UI benefits charged are computed in a fashion completely 
analogous to the methodology of Hunt (1986, 1987, and 1988). These results are 
used to compute the responsiveness of the experience rated UI tax system for a 
particular firm type for a particular spike of IUR across the 28 states 
examined in this study.
In the body of this paper marginal cost estimates and rankings of the 
Michigan degree of experience rating are reported. It is important to understand 
the foundation on which these estimates rest. First, we perform a control run 
of the model which yields a control estimate of total UI tax cost (Tc ) and a 
control estimate of total UI benefit charges (Bc ). Next we re-run the model 
imposing a spike of unemployment in period eleven, this yields a "spike" 
estimate of total UI tax cost (Ts ) and a spike estimate of total UI benefit
  For some states, including Tennessee and Kentucky which have broad 
steps in their tax schedule, tax rate stability is a situation where the tax 
rate, which depends on the ERA, fluctuates between two rates.
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charges (Bs ). Given these four figures, each of which is a sum computed over 
thirty periods, we can compute the UI tax response to a change in benefit 
charges. The result, which is called the marginal tax cost of a change in 
insured unemployment, or marginal cost (MC) for short, is the simple ratio of 
two changes. The formula is:
MC - (A Taxes/A Benefits) - (Ts - TC )/(BS - Bc )
Data to evaluate this expression for the average-average case, where the IUR   
2.9% and AAE -= $20,200, in Michigan with a 1% spike in insured unemployment is 
given in Table 4. Appendix A, at the back of this report, lists results in a 
similar format for all basic MC estimations conducted for this study. All 
index values and rankings discussed in this section of the report are based on 
results given in appendix tables A.I to A.36. For Michigan the average-average 
computation is simply:
MC = (TS -TC )/(BS -BC ) - (857,166 - 841,510)/(644,625 - 634,062) 
- (15,656)/(10,563) - 1.48
Table 4. Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value
Average IUR , Average Wages 
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $20,200)
State MC Tc Bc Ts Bs
Michigan 1.48 841,510 634,062 857,166 644,625
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The source of data for this computation is depicted graphically in figures 
2 and 3. Each of these figures displays information for the full thirty 
periods of the simulation. For the average-average case in Michigan Figure 2 
shows the control and spike values of the tax cost data, and Figure 3 shows the 
control and spike values of benefits charged. The value for the numerator in 
MC is the sum of the difference in the bars representing spike and control 
taxes in Figure 2, while the value in the denominator is the same difference 
for benefits in Figure 3. The result for benefits is easy to eyeball; it 
amounts to the simple difference in the period 11 bars as all others simply 
cancel out.
Another matter which is made clear by considering Figure 2 is that the UI 
tax considered as a response to a change in benefit charges is the entire 
future tax liability. In this case the taxes are paid over six years. ' Since 
a firm incurs this future cost at the time the layoff decision is made it is 
natural to consider the full cost as the present discounted value of those
o o
payments.   In this report, estimates of the degree of experience rating are 
given in both nominal (not discounted) and present value terms. Since the 
length of the payback period varies from three to five years or more across
9 7*•' The benefit ratio component of Michigan's UI tax considers a five year
benefit history, with a six month lag. The lag means that the final payment 
for liabilities incurred will not be made until the sixth calendar year after 
the year in which the benefits are paid.
op
The interest rate used for discounting purposes here is 10%. This is 
in line with the recent prime rate and somewhat above recent Treasury Bill 
rates. Ten percent is also lower than the median rate used by business firms 
for internal decision making in mid-1985 as reported by Summers (1987), and 
this is consistent with the fact that rates have generally fallen since that time
23
Figure 2. Ul Taxes, Average Average Michigan Rrm 
A 1% Spike of Insured Unemployment
1 23456789 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930 
BH Control Run Taxes \//\ Spike Run Taxes
Yoore
Figure 3. Benefits Charged, Average Average Michigan Firm
A 1% Spike of Insured Unemployment
OtoaflU Charged
1 2345678 9101112131415161718192021222324252627282930 
Hi Control Run V/\ Spike Run
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states, the ranking of states by degree of experience rating can be significantly 
altered by adding the discounting process.
The graphs of figures 2 and 3 show that in the average-average case for 
Michigan the payback stream is quite regular. It is not necessarily a typical 
case, but it provides a baseline from which to discuss some of the less 
standard possibilities. First, about the value of MC itself. When MC takes a 
value of 1.48 we can say that: "one dollar in additional benefit charges costs 
a firm, with the exact characteristics assumed here, $1.48 in additional UI 
taxes." This conclusion may seem surprising, but care must be taken to 
remember exactly what it means. This result applies only in the context of the 
precise case considered. Without doing a "macro" study of experience rating 
which would involve identifying the actual distribution of firms by IUR and 
AAE, we have no idea how many firms of the hypothetical type we consider exist 
in Michigan or other states.
Other estimates of MC which might seem surprising are also very possible 
under the statutory provisions of the states. For example, one finding which 
may seem troublesome is where MC  = 0, meaning that the tax system does not 
respond to changes in benefit charges. This can happen if a firm is already 
paying maximum tax rates prior to a spike in insured unemployment.
Extremely large values of MC may result from a popular provision in state 
statutory UI tax systems regarding the rounding of tax rates. Rather than 
employ the standard rule of arithmetic which calls for rounding to the "nearest" 
significant digit, many systems call for "rounding up." For example if a tax
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formula yields a tax rate of .0321 (3.21%), arithmetic rounding yields .032 
(3.2%) where as statutory rounding up yields .033 (3.3%). In the extreme such 
rounding rules may result in marginal costs which differ by a factor of ten. 
Rounding is one of the features of the Michigan combined benefit ratio-reserve
on
ratio system examined via sensitivity analysis in Section IV. 7
Since the three different levels of wages and unemployment in all possible 
combinations lead to nine basic simulations, it is easiest to array the cost 
estimates in a matrix in which total UI taxes in Michigan are compared to one 
of the regional averages. Thus, the primary estimates of experience rating in 
this study are contained in four sets of tables, each of which focuses on the 
experience of firms in Michigan relative to one of the regional groupings. 
Each of the four sets contains four tables. Results are presented for a 1% 
spike of unemployment in both nominal and present value terms; similarly 
nominal and present value tables are given for a spike of unemployment which 
amounts to a doubling of the IUR.
29 Some other surprising marginal cost estimates occur because of uneven 
tax increments. As mentioned earlier Tennessee and Kentucky, two reserve ratio 
states, have big steps in their tax schedules and resulting "equilibrium" 
initial tax rates which fluctuate. It is possible when tax rates fluctuate in 
this way that the present value of tax pay back may be greater than the nominal 
value. This can result because both the terms and the ordering of their 
relative magnitude in the pay back series may differ.
Another possibility in our model is a negative MC. In the period when 
layoffs occur, if the taxable wage base on individual earnings is greater than 
the average annual earnings of UI exhaustees ((25/52)*AAE for full year 
workers) the total taxable wage base and therefore total UI taxes could fall in 
that period. The total value of this one period drop could exceed the 
increased taxes in subsequent periods resulting in a negative marginal cost.
In Massachusetts and Washington the maximum duration of benefits is 30. 
In these states the average annual earnings of exhaustees is ((21/52)*(AAE of 
full year workers)), a formula which accounts for the presence of a waiting 
week in both states.
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The four sets of experience rating estimates presented in this section are 
in tables numbered 5a through 8d. In each set table a displays results based 
on nominal costs for a 1% spike of IUR, b gives results based on nominal costs 
for a doubling of IUR, c gives results based on the present value of costs for 
a 1% spike of IUR, and d gives results based on the present value of costs for 
a doubling of IUR. The tables numbered 5 list simulation results for the 
marginal cost and rank of Michigan relative to all 27 other states, those 
numbered 6 give similar results for Michigan relative to the seven other Great 
Lakes states, those numbered 7 give the MC and rank of Michigan relative to 12 
other Northeast-Northcentral states, and those numbered 8 give the MC and rank 
of Michigan relative to 12 Southern states.
While marginal cost and rank estimates for all states, firm types, and 
state groupings could be constructed from the data given in Tables A.I to A.36, 
the results here focus on Michigan only. In each table rankings are placed in 
each IUR-AAE cell in parentheses to the right of the marginal cost estimate. 
The range of rankings depends on the number of states in the grouping. The 
ordering is from highest MC to lowest, an approach consistent with UI benefit 
cost recovery.
Table 5a summarizes the nominal marginal cost and ranking for the 
hypothetical firms under the Michigan UI experience rating system compared to 
27 other state systems for a 1% spike of insured unemployment. The marginal 
cost (MC) estimates given indicate that all hypothetical firm types considered 
are effectively experience rated in Michigan. The rankings which appear in
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Table 5a. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 28 States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 




















Table 5b. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 28 States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table 5c. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 28 States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















Table 5d. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 28 States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 
(Michigan Rank in Parentheses)
Wages*
Insured 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table 6a. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 8 Great Lake States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 




















Table 6b. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 8 Great Lake States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table 6c. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 8 Great Lake States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















Table 6d. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates
and Rank of Michigan MC Among the 8 Great Lake States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table 7a. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC Among the 13 Northeast-North Central States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 




















Table 7b. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC Among the 13 Northeast-North Central States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 
(Michigan Rank in Parentheses)
Insured 


















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table 7c. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC Among the 13 Northeast-North Central States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















Table 7d. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC Among the 13 Northeast-North Central States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 
(Michigan Rank in Parentheses)
Insured 


















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table 8a. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC when added to a Group of 12 Southern States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 
(Michigan Rank in Parentheses)
Insured 


















Table 8b. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC when added to a Group of 12 Southern States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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Table 8c. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC when added to a Group of 12 Southern States 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















Table 8d. Michigan Marginal Cost (MC) Estimates and 
Rank of Michigan MC when added to a Group of 12 Southern States 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 




















a Firm wages: Low = $11,300, Average = $20,200, High = $32,700 
b Firm IUR : Low = 1.45%, Average = 2.9%, High = 5.8%
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parentheses in Table 5a are the position of Michigan when the MCs for a given 
firm type across all 28 states are ordered from high to low. The ranking 
results indicate that among the 28 states compared, Michigan is ranked no lower 
than sixth and is ranked first in two instances.
The nominal 1% spike results suggest that all firm types are relatively 
highly experience rated in Michigan, the MC estimates range from 1.03 to 1.84 
with these values always being ranked in the top six of the 28 states. The MC 
figures for the average-high and high-high firms are lower than for other firms 
because the tax rate cap for one component of the Michigan tax is reached for 
these firms when the IUR rises by 1%. Among the 28 states, the average-high 
and high-high firms are relatively as experience rated in Michigan as any other 
firm type considered, being ranked sixth and fourth respectively.
Comparing the responslveness of tax systems for a modest increase in IUR 
(Table 5a, a 1% rise in IUR) to their responslveness for a more severe spike in 
IUR (Table 5b, a doubling of IUR), Michigan's relative position among the 28 
states remains about the same.
The affect of introducing discounting into the process can be appreciated 
by comparing the nominal results from Tables 5a and 5b to the present value 1% 
and doubling IUR results given in 5c and 5d respectively. In Table 5c the 
present value results for a 1% spike in IUR are listed. These were computed by 
introducing a 10% discount rate when adding up the annual tax costs. Naturally 
the marginal cost figures fall as a result of discounting, but Michigan remains 
in the top quarter of the 28 states in terms of tax system responslveness. The
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relatively long five year benefit history in Michigan's tax formula only 
slightly affects the state experience rating ranking.
Tables 6a to 6d report comparisons for Michigan in a group of eight Great 
Lakes states. They show the same general trends as 5a through 5d. Michigan is 
always ranked in the top half of the Great Lakes states.
When five additional states are added to the Great Lakes states to form 
the Northeast-Northcentral states, the rankings remain nearly. This can be 
seen by comparing Tables 6a to 6d for the Great Lakes states with Tables 7a to 
7d for the Northeast-Northcentral states. These results obtain because the 
statutory UI tax provisions in the states added to the Great Lakes group to 
form the Northeast-Northcentral group (Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, and New Jersey) provide for relatively less tax response to changes 
in benefit charges.
Including Michigan with a number of Southern states to form a group of 
thirteen for interstate comparison, Michigan is found to be extremely experience 
rated. Tables 8a through 8d show that Michigan is always in the top four 
states in this group. The comparisons summarized in Tables 8a through 8d mean 
that for the hypothetical firms considered, the statutory UI tax rules in 
Michigan are very responsive to benefit charges relative to those in the twelve 
Southern states.
To summarize, the statutory provisions of the Michigan UI tax system 
experience rate the hypothetical firms considered here relatively well compared
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to other state systems. The Michigan system is equally responsive to modest 
and more severe bouts of insured unemployment. If all tax payback streams are 
discounted, the present value of cost recovery for the Michigan system is 
somewhat lower since Michigan has a relatively long pay back period compared to 
other states. For the regional groupings considered, the Great Lakes states 
have the highest relative degree of statutory experience rating, with Michigan 
always being ranked in the top half of the eight Great Lakes states.
IV. A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF
THE MICHIGAN UI EXPERIENCE RATING TAX SYSTEM
The UI tax code for Michigan is more complex than that in most other 
states. Indeed Michigan is one of only two states, the other being Pennsylvania, 
to have a system for determining experience rated taxes which involves both a 
benefit ratio and a reserve ratio tax. The objective of this section is to 
clearly lay out the features of the Michigan UI experience rating tax system, 
and then to assess the impact on the degree of experience rating which results 
from changing separately several of the key features of the system. This 
process is referred to here as a sensitivity analysis of the Michigan UI 
experience rating system.
For a firm in Michigan that has operated for five or more years with 
workers covered by unemployment insurance, the UI tax rate may have as many as 
four components. Two of these, the nonchargeable benefits component (NEC) and
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the solvency tax (ST) do not depend entirely on the firm's own experience, ^ 
while two others the chargeable benefits component (CBC) and the account 
building component (ABC) depend only on the firm's individual experience. It 
is these latter two taxes on which this discussion focuses.
Our approach is to first develop the Michigan formula for experience rated 
taxes in a particular year, t, (ERTt ) and then outline the systematic analysis 
of this formula. We first consider the CBC component of the formula, which is 
a benefit ratio tax. It is computed as the sum of the ratio of benefits 
charged (BC) against a firm to the firm's total taxable wages (TTW) over the 
last 5 years, or
BRt = [S?=l(BCt . i )/l5=1 (TTWt _ i )] « Benefit Ratio.
The CBC tax rate is capped at 6% or .06, so that the CBC rate for a given year 
t is:
CBCt - min[.06,(BRt )] - Chargeable Benefits Component.
The ABC depends on a reserve ratio, where the reserve is the balance in a 
firm's experience rating account (ERA). In Michigan there is a target level
 ^ The NEC is a 1% flat tax levied on the taxable wage base of all UI 
taxable employers in the state. An ST may be levied against firms with a 
negative experience rating account (ERA) balance if there is outstanding 
interest bearing debt owed to the federal government. The ST is therefore 
partially experience rated.
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for the ERA set at 3.75% of a firm's total wages (TW) paid in a year. 31 The 
ABC tax rate depends on the experience rating account deficiency (ERAD) from 
the target
ERADt - (.OSySxTWt.! - ERAt _i) - ERA Deficiency,
relative to total wages (ERADR),
ERADRt - ((.0375xTWt . 1 -ERAt . 1 )/TWt _ 1 ) - ERA Deficiency Ratio,
where, TWt is total wages in year t, and ERAt is the experience rating account
balance at the start of year t. The ABC tax rate
is capped at 3% or .03, so that the rate for a given year t is:
ABCt = min[.03,(ERADRtx(.5))] = Account Building Component.
Note the multiplier of one-half (.5) which is applied to ERADR in this formula. 
Statutory provisions change this multiplier as the state trust fund balance
O o
changes. ^ This multiplier obviously has a major impact on the ABC tax.
The CBC and ABC rates are combined by simple addition with the resulting 
range of experience rated tax rates being zero to nine percent. Multiplying
O I
•* The target ERA level depends on the payroll for the twelve months 
which end six months prior to start of the tax year.
O ry
JZ See the Michigan Employment Security Act Section 19.4.
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this result by total taxable wages (TTW) yields the total experience rated 
taxes (ERT),
ERTt - TTWtx( CBCt + ABCt ) = Experience Rated Taxes.
The following six features of the Michigan UI experience rating tax system 
were subjected to sensitivity analysis: 1) The reserve ratio multiple, 2) The 
reserve ratio denominator, 3) The number of years in the benefit history, 4) 
The taxable wage base, 5) The tax rate ceilings, and 6) The rounding rules.
Figure 4 clearly summarizes the array of changes considered. The top half 
of Figure 4 lists definitions of and notation for fundamental concepts. These 
are then combined to form a complete statement of Michigan experience rated 
taxes (ERT). Below this one line statement are listed the six categories of 
items considered in the sensitivity analysis. These are listed with their 
statutory and alternative values. With the exception of the sixth item, arrows 
are drawn from each of the categories to the part of the ERT formula where they 
enter. The last item in the list, change in the rounding rule, applies to the
final result of the separate CBC and ABC formulae.
)
Results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Tables 9a through 
lOd. Table 9a lists estimates of the nominal marginal tax cost of UI benefit 
charges (MC) for all nine hypothetical firm types and a 1% spike of IUR under 
the 1988 Michigan UI statutes and under the variety of six categories of 
changes detailed in Figure 4. The basic format of Table 9a is repeated in the 
seven other tables which report the results of the statutory sensitivity
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Figure 4. A Guide to Sensitivity Analysis of Michigan 
Experience Rated UI Taxes to Statutory Change
ERTt = Experience Rated Taxes in year t.
TTWt - Total Taxable Wages in year t.
BCt   Benefits Charged against a firm in year t.
TWt - Total Wages in year t.
ERAt - Experience Rating Account balance at the start of year t.
BRt - [!i=l(Bct-i)/£i=l(TTWt-i)] - Benefit Ratio
CBCt - min[ .06, (BRt )] - Chargeable Benefits Component
ERADRt - ((.0375xTWt _ 1 - ERAt . 1 )/TWt . 1 ) - ERA Deficiency Ratio.
ABCt - min[ .03, (ERADRtx( .5)) ] - Account Building Component
ERTt - TTWtx( CBCt + ABCt ) - Experience Rated Taxes
ERTt=TTWtx(min[.06,([
03,(((.0375xTWt . 1 -ERAt; . 1 )/TWt: . 1 )x(.5))])




2<^ Change in the reserve ratio denominator 
from TWt to TTWt .
'3. Change in the number of years history in benefit 
ratio computation from 5 to 4 and 3.
' Change in TTWt from $9,500 to $10,000, $12,000, $14,000, 
$15,000, $16,000, $18,000, $19,000, $25,000, $35,000.
/Change in the max(CBC,ABC) from (.06,.03) to (.07,.03), (.08,.03), (.09,.03) 
(.06,.04), (.07,.04), (.08,.04), (.09,.04), (.06,.05), (.07,.05), (.08,.05),and 
(.09,.05).
6. Change the tax rate rounding rule from the statutory round up to the next .001 to 
round to the nearest .001.
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analysis. Table 9b gives the nominal sensitivity results under a doubling of 
IUR. Table 9c and 9d show in present value terms the results given in Tables 
9a and 9b respectively.
Before proceeding to discuss the particular results in detail, it should 
be mentioned that some of the most interesting results are related to item six 
of Figure 4, the rounding provisions. On the whole there is more consistency 
across the MC estimates when the statutory rule to determine tax rates is 
removed; that is to say, when no rounding is done. To get a better feel for 
the implications of changes in various program parameters the computations done 
to calculate the estimates given in Tables 9a through 9d were re-done after 
removing the statutory rounding rule. The results of this effort are given in 
Tables lOa through lOd.
The full set of tables are presented here for completeness. We choose, 
however, to focus our discussion of the results on those for a 1% spike of 
insured unemployment with a nominal value payback. For statutory rounding 
these results are given in Table 9a, results for the same cases without 
rounding are given in Table lOa.
Across the top row of Table 9a are given the nominal MC estimates for the 
nine hypothetical firms, given 1988 Michigan UI statutes and a 1% spike of IUR. 
These figures show all hypothetical firm types to be effectively experience 
rated, with marginal cost (MC) ranging from 1.03 to 1.84. Each of the several 
rows below the top line report MC estimates for a single program change.
Table 9a. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes 
A 12 Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 
Statutory Rounding
Firm Type (lUR-Wage) 
MC for 1988 Statutes
Statutory Change









































3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
1.46 1.73 1.61 1.46 1.76 1.64 1.84 1.07 1.03
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years



































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Change in rounding rule
Is___round up to next .001 
round to nearest .001 1.46 1.36 1 . 13 1.30 1.30 1. 15 1.33 0.87 0.86
Table 9b. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value 
Statutory Rounding 44
Firm Type (lUR-Wage) L-L L-A L-H A-L A-A A-H H-L H-A H-H 
MC for 1988 Statutes 1.33 1.56 1.55 1.55 1.50 1.45 1.86 1.01 1.00
Statutory Change






















2. Change in the reserve 
ratio denominator
Is Total Wages
Total Taxable Wages 1.33 1.81 1.88 1.61 1.79 1.85 1.92 1.01 1.00
3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years











5. Change in the max(CBC, ABC)










































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Change in rounding rule
Is___round up to next .001 
round to nearest .001 1.78 1.37 1. 11 1.78 1.44 1.24 1.67 0.97 0.97
Table 9c. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes 
A 1Z Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 
Statutory Rounding
Firm Type (lUR-Wage) 
MC for 1988 Statutes
Statutory Change







































2. Change in the reserve 
ratio denominator
Is Total Wages
Total Taxable Wages 1.15 1.34 1.26 1.15 1.37 1.28 1.42 0.91 0.84
3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years



































































































































































































































































































































































































6. Change in rounding rule
Is___round up to next .001 
round to nearest .001 1 . 19 1.23 0. 84 1. 15 1. 18 0.85 1.02 0. 64 0.57
Table 8d. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value 
Statutory Rounding
Firm Type (lUR-Wage) 
MC for 1988 Statutes
Statutory Change











































3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years











5. Change in the max(CBC, ABC)











































































































































































































































































































































6. Change in rounding rule
Is_____round up to next .001 
round to nearest .001 1.41 1. 17 0.82 1. 42 1. 16 0.92 1.28 0. 70 0.59
Table lOa. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes




Firm Type (lUR-Wage) 
MC for 1988 Statutes
Statutory Change






































2. Change in the reserve 
ratio denominator
Is JTotal Wages
Total Taxable Wages 1.81 1.82 1.81 1.82 1.82 1.81 1.84 1.00 1.00
3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years



































































































































































































































































































































































































Table lOb. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value
No Rounding
Firm Type <IUR-Wage) L-L L-A L-H A-L A-A A-H H-L 































3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
1.81 1.82 1.81 1.82 1.82 1.81 1.84 1.00 1.00
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years

























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table lOc. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes




Firm Type (lUR-Wage) 
MC for 1988 Statutes 
Statutory Change








3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years
4. Change in the TTW










5. Change in the max(CBC, ABC)



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Table lOd. MC Sensitivity Results from Changes in Michigan UI Statutes JU
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value
No Rounding
Firm Type (lUR-Wage) L-L L-A L-H A-L A-A A-H H-L H-A H-H 
MC for 1988 Statutes 1.32 1.14 1.01 1.33 1.14 1.01 1.35 0.70 0.59
Statutory Change


























3. Change in the number of years 
in the benefit history
1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.41 0.82 0.80
Is _5 years 
4 years 
3 years














































































































































































































































































































































































The first set of sensitivity results presented in Table 9a report the 
results of changes in the multiplier on the experience rating account deficiency 
ratio (ERADR) in the ABC formula. If the ABC part of the total tax rate during 
any of the periods of the simulation run is greater than zero, it is expected 
that reducing this multiple should cause the MC to fall. From Table 9a it can 
be seen that a reduction in the ABC reserve ratio multiple from .50 to .33 
causes all MC estimates to either fall or stay the same. Reading across the 
firms from left to right the first seven MCs fall, MC remains constant for the 
firms with high IUR (5.8%) and average or high wages. A second reduction in 
the multiple to .25 can be seen to reduce the MC even further. The reductions 
in MC are observed for all firm types in Table lOa where there is no rounding. 
Recall that the reason for removing the rounding rules is to clearly illustrate 
the workings of the statutory provisions.
The second set of results given in Table 9a report on the effect of 
replacing total wages in the denominator of the reserve ratio of the ABC with 
total taxable wages. Since, on a per worker basis, all hypothetical firms have 
average wages greater than the Michigan taxable wage base of $9,500, this 
change would tend to raise tax rates and therefore MC. This increase in the MC 
will only occur if the ABC rate before the change was not always at the upper 
limit of .03 (3%). Furthermore, the increase in MC should be relatively more 
for higher wage firms since the reduction in the denominator of ERADR is 
greater. The estimates all either increase or remain unchanged. The estimates 
given for item two in Table lOa provide even stronger confirmation of the 
effect of this statute change on the degree of experience rating.
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It is also important to note that the MC estimates for the first seven 
firm types listed in Table lOa (the firms below the CBC cap) the MC is about 
the same across all firms and equal to around 1.82, whereas MC falls as total 
wages rise under current statutory law. This occurs because under current law 
total wages is used as the base to calculate the ABC tax rate. Thus the 
calculated tax rate must fall as firm wages rise, lowering MC.
The third change considered is the number of years in the history of 
benefit charges in the CBC. Michigan considers a five year history, the 
longest among the states. The alternatives considered here are four and three 
years. The change to fewer years essentially speeds up the benefit pay back, 
associated with the CBC component of the tax, thereby decreasing any ERA 
deficiency sooner and lowering any ABC taxes. The results given in Table 9a 
are generally consistent with the expectations, except that for high IUR firms 
with average and high wages MC remains constant. Again, this is due to the cap 
on the CBC tax rate. The single contradictory result is found for a firm with 
low IUR and low wages. For this firm the MC with the three year benefit 
history is greater than that for a four year history; indeed it is greater than 
for the statutory case of a five year history. This result must be due to the 
statutory rounding provisions as it disappears in the results based on no 




The fourth item changed is the taxable wage base. ~) In Table 9a we report 
on a sensitivity analysis of experience rating for nine alternative total 
taxable wage (TTW) levels. It is expected that by increasing the taxable wage 
base there will be an increase in MC, but that MC across firm types should 
equalize as the TW rises and the various constraints in the system become 
ineffective. Recall the possible average wages (Low - $11,300, Average -= 
$20,200, High - $32,700) for the hypothetical firm types. Due to the statutory 
rounding the results in Table 9a are difficult to clearly interpret, but in 
Table lOa it can easily be seen that as TTW rises the MC rises until the firm's 
average wage level is reached. Furthermore, in the absence of rounding MC 
across firms equalizes around 1.82. This result is universally true for the 
Michigan system when all tax rate caps and taxable wage base ceilings are 
ineffective.
If the tax rate caps on CBC and ABC are binding constraints on the taxes 
levied on a firm, raising these caps should result in higher MC estimates. The 
fifth set of sensitivity results are a guide to exactly which experience rated 
tax rate ceilings are binding for the various firm types. In either Table 9a 
or Table lOa, under item 5 the MC estimates remain unchanged as the CBC and ABC 
ceilings are changed for the first seven firm types. For the high IUR average 
wage (H-A) firm it is seen that the CBC cap is a binding constraint, when the 
CBC cap is raised to 7% MC rises and further increases in the CBC cap leave MC 
unchanged. Holding CBC constant and raising the ABC cap does not affect MC for 
the H-A firm; the ABC cap is not a binding constraint. In the absence of caps,
O o
-> -> Hamermesh (1977) has argued that the taxable wage base for UI should 
equal that used for social security taxes. In 1988 the taxable wage base for 
social security was $45,000.
54
the CBC rate for the H-H firm would be between 7% and 8%. Also, for the H-H 
firm the cap on the ABC is not a binding constraint. When the ABC and CBC caps 
are made ineffective MC estimates rise, however, the MCs do not equalize across 
firms, at say 1.81.
It can be shown that when total taxable wages is the denominator in ERADR, 
if firms do not hit CBC and ABC caps, MC becomes equal across firms at about 
1.82 regardless of the spike of IUR. Raising the TTW achieves the same result 
once total payroll is less than or equal to total taxable wages (TTW). For the 
H-A and H-H firms when TTW   $35,000 the caps become ineffective because the 
benefit ratio in CBC falls.
Finally, as discussed in Section III, Michigan statutes call for the 
various components of the total UI tax rate to be rounded up to the next .001 
instead of to the nearest .001, which is the standard rule for rounding in 
arithmetic. For example, if a tax formula yields a rate of .0221 (2.21%) 
arithmetic rounding gives .022 (2.2%) whereas Michigan statutory rounding up 
yields .023 (2.3%). On first consideration the only potential impact of this 
change would seem to be a reduction in marginal cost. However, changing the 
rounding rule from the round-up to arithmetic rounding could result in an 
increase, a decrease, or no change in MC estimates, since the rounding rules 
are applied to both the control and the spike level of taxes. The arithmetic 
rule will sometimes round the tax rate up, just as the statutory rule, and 
sometimes round it down. Since MC is computed as spike minus control taxes, if 
the control level of taxes falls (i.e., the tax rate is rounded down not up)
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and the spike level of taxes remains unchanged (i.e., both rules round up) the 
MC will rise.
For all of the nine cases considered on Table 9.a, the change to arithmetic 
rounding reduces the MC. Across the four tables 9. a to 9.d, MC rises for eight 
of the thirty-six cases, this is somewhat less than would be predicted on 
probability grounds. The arithmetic rounding was included as an item in the 
list of statutory features to adjust in the sensitivity analysis, since it is a 
potential policy option. While rounding up is likely to slightly increase tax 
revenues to the UI trust fund, the sensitivity analysis confirms that the 
impact on experience rating for a particular firm is uncertain. In some of the 
cases considered rounding up increases the responsiveness of taxes to benefit 
payment changes, but in the majority of the cases examined here it diminishes 
the effective degree of experience rating.
Overall, the sensitivity analysis performed for a doubling of the IUR 
yielded results similar to those for the 1% spike. It should be observed that 
when the CBC cap is ineffective, replacing total wages in the ERADR denominator 
with total taxable wages (the second of the six features subjected to sensitivity 
analysis) the nominal MC is about 1.82 for the doubling IUR spike. The same as 
when the caps are removed and a 1% spike is imposed.
While the discounted results are uniformly smaller than the nominal 
results, the comparisons across estimates remain similar.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study has been to compare unemployment insurance 
experience rating in Michigan to that in 27 other states in 1988. The full 
impact of the current UI statutes is approximated, since all of the provisions 
of the 1988 statutes are fully reflected in firm costs and benefit payments. 
Since the interstate comparisons are made for hypothetical situations in which 
the firm and worker characteristics are identical across states, differences in 
experience rating across states can be attributed to differences in their UI 
statutes.
The research underlying this study was accomplished using a detailed, 
micro-simulation model, called UIMSM. UIMSM reproduces the manner in which 
both worker benefits and employer UI taxes are determined in each state. The 
model is necessarily highly stylized, meaning that it is by no means a complete 
description of the institutional characteristics of UI or the complicated world 
in which firms actually operate. The limitations of UIMSM notwithstanding, our 
judgment is that UIMSM incorporates the most important benefit and tax features 
of each state's UI system for the hypothetical firms and workers investigated 
in this study.
The statutory provisions of the Michigan UI tax system experience rate the 
hypothetical firms considered here relatively well compared to other state 
systems. Taxes for firms under the Michigan system are equally responsive to 
modest and more severe bouts of insured unemployment. If all tax payback 
streams are discounted, the present value of cost recovery for the Michigan
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system is somewhat lower since Michigan has a relatively long pay back period 
compared to other states. Among the regional groupings considered, the Great 
Lakes states have the highest relative degree of statutory experience rating, 
and Michigan is always ranked in the top half of the eight Great Lakes states.
The sensitivity analysis of the statutes confirmed certain expectations, 
and revealed several other interesting facts about how the various provisions 
in the Michigan UI tax system affect the degree of experience rating.
It was not surprising to find that a reduction in the multiplier on the 
experience rating account deficiency ratio in the ABC reduces marginal tax 
costs, or that raising tax rate caps affects only those firms currently at the 
maximum rates. Also as expected was the finding that a shorter benefit history 
in the benefit ratio of the CBC lowers marginal tax cost.
Perhaps the most enlightening result of the sensitivity analysis related 
to changes in the taxable wage base. Changing the denominator in the experience 
rating account deficiency ratio from total payroll to the total taxable wage 
base raises the marginal tax cost, but also leads to equality of the marginal 
UI tax cost of benefit charges across firm types. This same phenomenon of 
marginal tax costs becoming equal results when the taxable wage base is raised 
to exceed the average annual wage in all firms. Furthermore, marginal costs 
become equal across firm types for these statutory changes when either a modest 
or a more severe spike of insured unemployment occurs.
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Finally, we repeat one important caveat concerning the interpretation of 
these results. The estimates reported here apply only in the in the context of 
the carefully specified cases considered. Without a close examination of the 
actual distribution of firms by insured unemployment, average wages, and 
initial reserve account level, we can not reasonably estimate how many firms of 
the hypothetical type considered here actually exist in Michigan or other 
states. Similarly, we may have provided little information here concerning how 
well the systems experience rate firms which do exist. The present findings 
should be reexamined in the context of a "macro" study which relies on the 
actual distribution of firms by insured unemployment, average wages, and 
initial reserve account level.
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
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Table A.I Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Nominal Value in Dollars
Low IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $11,300)









































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
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Table A.2 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Low IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $11,300)









































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
k PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
Table A.3 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Low IUR f Average Wages
(IUR = 1.45% f Wages = $20,200)
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a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.4 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Low IUR , Average Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $20,200)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.5 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Nominal Value in Dollars
Low IUR , High Wages 















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
k TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.6 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Low IUR , High Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $32,700)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
Table A.7 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Average IUR , Low Wages
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $11,300)
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a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.8 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Average IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $11,300)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
k PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.9 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Average IUR , Average Wages















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
k TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.10 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Average IUR , Average Wages
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $20,200)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.11 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Average IUR , High Wages















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.12 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Average IUR , High Wages 
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $32,700)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.13 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
High IUR , Low Wages 















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
k TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.14 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
High IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR = 5.8% , Wages = $11,300)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
k PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
Table A.15 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value~ in Dollars
High IUR , Average Wages
(IUR =5.8% , Wages = $20,200)
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a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
k TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.16 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
High IUR , Average Wages 
(IUR = 5.8% , Wages = $20,200)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.17 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
High IUR , High Wages















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A. 18 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A 1% Increase in the Insured Unemployment Rate 
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
High IUR , High Wages 
(IUR =5.8% , Wages = $32,700)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
k PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.19 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Low IUR , Low Wages 















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.20 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Low IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $11,300)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
Table A.20 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Low .IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $11,300)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.21 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Low IUR , Average Wages















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A. 2 2 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Low IUR , Average Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $20,200)
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a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
k PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% 
IUR increase) run.
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Table A.23 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Low IUR , High Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $32,700)









































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.24
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Low IUR , High Wages 
(IUR = 1.45% , Wages = $32,700)










































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) 
run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
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Table A. 25 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Average IUR , Low Wages















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.26
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Average IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $11,300)









































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) 
run.




Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Average IUR , Average Wages
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $20,200)









































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.28
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Average IUR , Average Wages 
(IUR = 2.9% , Wages = $20,200)









































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) 
run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
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Table A.29 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
Average IUR , High Wages
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $32,700)









































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.30
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
Average IUR , High Wages 
(IUR =2.9% , Wages = $32,700)









































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
^ PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) 
run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
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Table A.31 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
High IUR , Low Wages 















































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
k TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.32
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
High IUR , Low Wages 
(IUR = 5.8% , Wages = $11,300)









































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
b PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) 
run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (!% IUR 
increase) run.
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Table A.33 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation 
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
High IUR , Average Wages
(IUR =5.8% , Wages = $20,200)









































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.34
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
High IUR , Average Wages 
(IUR =5.8% , Wages = $20,200)









































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
k PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) 
run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
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Table A.35 Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Nominal Value in Dollars
High IUR , High Wages
(IUR =5.8% , Wages = $32,700)









































































































































































a MC = (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Marginal UI tax cost of a change 
in benefit charges.
b TAX = Total UI taxes in control run.
c BC = Total UI benefits charged in control run.
d TAXNEW = Total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
e BCNEW = Total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR increase) run.
Table A.36
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Total Figures for Marginal Cost Computation
A Doubling of the Insured Unemployment Rate
Present Value in Dollars (Interest Rate = 10%)
High IUR , High Wages 
(IUR =5.8% , Wages = $32,700)









































































































































































a PVMC = Present value of (TAXNEW - TAX)/(BCNEW - BC) = Present value 
of marginal UI tax cost of a change in benefit charges.
k PVTAX = Present value of total UI taxes in control run.
c PVBC = Present value of total UI benefits charged in control run.
d PVTAXNEW = Present value of total UI taxes in spike (1% IUR increase) 
run.
e PVBCNEW = Present value of total UI benefits charged in spike (1% IUR 
increase) run.
